The game itself was not zero-sum since the speed determined the amount of payment. In the bilateral threat condition, each player possessed a gate. A gate-endowed player could, if necessary, travel the longer alternate route while depriving the other player of the main road. Of course, if both were intransigent, neither would receive a reward. There would be no payoff to either unless one backed up to take the alternate route but in that case the other would have unimpeded access to the faster main route. The subjects who answered the research call were females at a telephone company.īecause a route could only be traveled by one truck, both always possessed some threat since one could block the main route. Three conditions were examined: in the first, neither party possessed a threat (a gate that blocked the main route), in another only one possessed the threat, and in the third they both did. There were two routes, a direct one and an alternate. Levy, in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008 The factor of threatĭeutsch and Krauss developed a simulation game for two players with rewards for rapid delivery of goods by truck: the faster the delivery the greater the payoff.
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